Abstract. Financial regulation is effective to control financial risk and to promote economic development. However, when making decision separately, regulation institutions tend to maximize their own profit and ignore cooperation. Considering the factor of cost and profit, the paper studied the cooperation decision in financial regulation with the method of game theory and discussed cooperation possibility between central bank and regulatory institutions in different situations. The paper studied the situation which the fifth solution to replicator dynamic equation does not exist. We find a situation when cooperation probability of both sides increase as time goes on. In this circumstance, the profit that uncooperative party gains due to free ride is smaller than the profit when both of parties cooperate.
Introduction
Up to now, many scholars from home and abroad have carried out researches involving financial regulation and gain remarkable results which are listed but not limited as follows.
Saltuk Ozerturk (2017) [1] studied the impact that issuer skin in the game regulation has exerted on CRA's rating accuracy with the consideration of moral hazard problem. Rahim Khanizad, Dr. Gholamali Montazer (2017) [2] studied the game theory in banking system. Based on the comparison of the cooperative and non-cooperative games in a testing environment, it is shown that, instead of competition, the cooperation between banks could provide more benefits.
There are also fruitful contributions made by domestic scholars. Ba Shusong and Sheng Changzheng (2016) [3] believed financial regulatory system depended on financial structure and the traditional separate supervision could not suit the requirement of financial regulation. They argued financial regulatory policies were not unified which made it possible for regulatory arbitrage and even gave rise to regulation competition. Zhang Zhiyuan (2015) [4] studied the cooperation choice in financial regulation with game theory, found the equilibrium solution and discussed the cooperation possibility between central bank and regulatory institutions. However, he ignored the necessary condition when getting the fifth solution, about which this paper is going to study.
The Study of Financial Regulation Cooperation with the Game Theory Model
Considering cost and profit, this paper studies the cooperation in financial regulation in China with game theory. There are hypotheses in the model: the information is asymmetric when making decision; the decision making is repetitive and continuous; both sides can choose to cooperate or not with a certain probability; cost and profit is perceptible.
Four situations involve where central bank and three regulatory institutions face in model. Noncooperation Between Two Parties. When the two parties do not cooperate, they do not have to pay the cost for cooperation in financial regulation. Assume the revenue central bank gets as Therefore, we get the profit functions:
C for central bank and 
π R S C for three regulatory institutions. We set x meaning the probability central bank cooperates and y representing the probability three institutions cooperate, both of which vary from 0 to 1. In addition, set t as time. According to Yu Weisheng(2007) [5] , the replicator dynamic equation of the central bank is
Set F(x) as 0, there is:
We can see that when ( ) ( ) 
The paper will discuss the situation in detail when ( ) ( ) 
There are several propositions after induction.
Proposition 1: Central bank:
Regulation institutions:
In this case, 
Proposition 2: Central bank:
, it is easy to deduce that: 12 22 ( )
In this case, 1 k <0，the cooperation possibility of central bank(x) decrease with the increasing t.
Similarly, when ( )
Now that 1 k >0，so cooperation possibility of central bank(x) will increase with the increasing t.
In addition, under this proposition, 21
Proposition 3: Central bank:
Put it into Eq.5, we finally get the solution:
2 k <0，so the cooperation possibility of three institutions(y) will decrease as time goes on.
Similarly, when Proposition 4: Central bank:
With the deduction above, we can conclude that: when 
, there is a negative correlation between the y and t.
Summary
As we can conclude from discussion above, in proposition 1, we can get the fifth equilibrium solution through Zhang's model. In proposition 2, the fifth equilibrium solution does not exist as for central bank. But we find that when 1 k >0, the cooperation possibility of central bank will increase as time goes on. When 1 k <0, the cooperation possibility of central bank decrease as time goes on
In proposition 3, the fifth equilibrium solution does not exist as for three regulatory institutions. However, when 2 k >0, the cooperation possibility of three regulatory institutions increase as time goes on. When 2 k <0, the cooperation possibility of three regulatory institutions decrease as time goes on.
In proposition 4, the fifth equilibrium solution does not exist for both sides. The relations between t and the two sides' cooperation decisions depend on 1 k and 2 k .
Taking all propositions together, it is easy to find it is optimal to both parties when 1 k >0, 2 k >0. Because the profit that uncooperative party gains due to free ride is smaller than that when both of the parties cooperate. Besides, both of parties get positive profit when there is no cooperation.
